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The international debate on forest 
management transfer and our contribution
Thorkil CASSE1
I – The local management of forest resources : 
our contribution
The international debate on the local management of forest resources is 
focused on how to protect the forest (conservation) while leaving an opportunity 
for local people to gain from the exploitation of forest resources (resource 
access). This is a contribution to this debate, and concludes that the attempt 
in Madagascar to reconcile these two often contradictory objectives ends 
in a place between a fully fledged success and a tremendous failure. Why ? 
Because, even in the event that research is focused on a specific geographical 
area, the conclusion (success or failure) depends on the importance any given 
researcher devotes to each of the two objectives. If the objectives are not 
unequivocally defined at departure, interpretations of all sorts will queue up 
one after the other.
Formulated differently, we end up by concluding that meeting the 
conservation criterion in the long run is at stake if alternatives to forest 
exploitation are absent. If land, forested or cleared from forest, is posteriorly 
recognized by the authorities as legal, if not a formal entitlement, the resource 
access criterion is easier to meet. If the prioritization of potential conservation 
areas is crucial to policy makers in a context of scarce financial resources, 
the transfer of management may still stand a chance, even when no economic 
alternatives are suggested to local people. The forest offers shelter to cattle, 
and due to this functional value villagers may still see an interest in the 
conservation of the forest, even in the event of no direct economic benefits 
being included in the management contracts. 
1 Associate Professor, Roskilde University, Denmark ; mail : casse@ruc.dk 
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Through our we demonstrate how the transfer of the management of forest 
resources to local communities becomes instrumental for the various strategies 
of the different stakeholders. The forest authorities, the implementing agency, 
the NGOs, and the villagers determine their position and willingness to accept 
the transfer in accordance with their own long-term strategies. An example 
illustrates the challenge. A transfer of management is based on a contract in 
terms of the sustainable use of forest resources, whereas villagers act in terms 
of the use of all resources, not only forest resources. If restrictions are imposed 
on the use of forest resources within a specific spatial area, villagers will 
claim access to other forest resources (outside a local management scheme) 
or insist on improvements in agricultural techniques (for example access to an 
irrigation scheme). 
The transfer of management is an instrument for residents in some areas 
to exclude migrants (‘they cut down the forest and should not be members 
of the local management set-up’) whereas the transfer in other places is 
used by migrants to acquire an informal, but locally recognized entitlement 
to land. Local people are not passive stakeholders in a process where critics 
of the transfer of management tend to regard transfers as an environmental 
imposition from outside to hinder local access to the forest resources. Local 
villagers reinterpret the rules in accordance with their own proper strategies. 
Emphasising the local reinterpretation of rules is maybe the most important 
contribution of our analysis of the transfer of forest management in Madagascar.
2 – The local management of forest resources : the debate
For many years, the protection of nature was dominated by ideas about 
separating animals from man. National parks were created in the US and 
then the idea spread to other countries. By 1972, more than 250 parks were 
established in Africa (Weber and Vedder, 2001). Later this approach was called 
‘fortress conservation’ or the ‘fences and fines approach’ (Hutton et al., 2005). 
During the 1980s and 1990s a community approach became part of 
the agendas at the World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas 
(Hulme and Murphree, 2001). The acceptance of the community approach 
is supposed to have four grounds. First, the Brundtland Report in 1987 and 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development had the ultimate 
objective of bringing together conservation and human development. Second, 
a romantic idea about the community emerged in contrast to the state. Third, 
new concepts in development circles became common jargon even within 
the conservation sphere  : top-down, technocratic compared to bottom-up, 
and participatory methods. Fourth, the market approach promoted by new 
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conservative governments in the US and in Europe challenged the earlier belief 
in states’ abilities and thus the state planning of national parks and reserves.
Weber and Vedder (2001) refer to the publication of the ‘World 
Conservation Strategy’ in 1981 – a joint effort from worldwide conservation 
organizations IUCN (International Union for Nature Conservation), WWF 
(World Wildlife Fund) and UNDP (United Nations Development Program) – as 
the fundamental change in approach, linking conservation with development. 
The practical outcome was the creation of Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects (ICDP) which attracted much donor money during the 
1990s and at least were temporarily seen as the vehicle with which to reconcile 
the conservation and the development objectives.
Over the years it turned out that lessons were difficult to derive from 
the ICDP since there is often no baseline information available, and because 
most activities were financially unsustainable. When baseline information 
concerning the situation before the start of an ICDP is missing, it is difficult to 
evaluate whether the results of the project were positive or negative. Activities 
entirely based on donor funding fall apart once the funding dries out.
Moreover, the so-called fortress conservation approach made its 
conspicuous re-entry on the scene as natural scientists increasingly distrusted 
the conservation efforts of nature in areas of community management. 
Hutton et al. (2005, p. 347) list five arguments for this pendulum swing to the 
barriers (as they call the process) : 
- Protected areas require strict protection.
- Biodiversity conservation is a moral imperative.
- Conservation linked to development does not protect biodiversity.
- Harmonious, ecologically friendly local communities are myths.
- Emergency situations require extreme measures.
Reviewing the support of donors, Hutton et al. (2005) further state that 
both USAID and the British DFID have backed out of their former endorsement 
of the community approach. In Madagascar, the transfer of management of 
natural resources, in our case forest resources, was sustained by financial 
funding from the French and the Swiss Intercooperation, not USAID, though 
they engage in donor activities in the country. 
Concluding this short review of the debate about local management 
of natural resources, in our view part of the debate is wrong footed. Pure 
protection might be required in cases of threatened species or attacks on 
crucial ecosystems. However, a community approach will still be valid in 
areas of less than international importance and, more importantly, local people 
cannot be expelled from all areas of protection interest. Compared to other 
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forest management types, the forest area designated by the state for use of 
communities makes up a share of 9 % of the total worldwide forest cover and 
privately owned forests by communities add another 2 % to the forest area 
under community management (Sunderlin et al., 2008, p. 7). 
The debate on how to strike a balance between conservation and 
development is very lively. In a debate on local conservation, placing greater 
emphasis on conservation than development though the distinction with 
respect to the local management of natural resources is not clear, Vermeulen 
and Sheil (2007, p. 437) argue in favour of partnerships : 
Partnerships can be understood as a means to share the portfolio of risks associated 
with an undertaking… in a hypothetical example of a community-based 
ecotourism project, a conservation agency may agree to shoulder and mitigate 
regulatory risks, whilst local partners work to reduce safety risks (e.g. damage to 
fields and livestock by wild animals).
One of major advantages of the local management of natural resources 
might rightly be the sharing of risks ; an aspect often overlooked in the debate.
3 – The local management of forest resources :  
our point of departure
This volume is the culmination of a research project (‘Is community 
forestry the answer to the environmental crisis in Madagascar  ?’) which 
received a grant from the Danish Council for Social Science Research. Three 
articles are written by researchers outside the original network. The original 
idea, in 2005, was to address the following research question
Has the implementation of Gelose/GCF (Gestion Locale Sécurisée/ Gestion 
Contractualisée des Forêts : Locally guaranteed management/ Contact-based 
management of forest) in south-western Madagascar led to any improvement in 
economic output (efficiency), equity and/or ecological quality ?
The transfer of management of forest resources to communities in 
Madagascar is instituted by an act adopted by Parliament in 1996 (Loi n° 96‑025). 
The first National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) was formulated in 
1987-88, supported by the World Bank. Domestic NGOs proliferated during 
the implementation of NEAP1 (1990-1996). They did this by participation in 
the preparation and execution of Integrated Conservation and Development 
Projects. During the NEAP2 (1997-2002), the services of NGOs were replaced 
by the Malagasy National Park Service (ANGAP). One of the problems 
encountered during NEAP1 was the creation of tension between expatriates 
and locals and between ANGAP and the forest authorities Direction des Eaux 
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et Forêts (DEF  : Department of Water and Forest)). In NEAP2, classified 
forests became equally important to conservation (Gezon, 2000 and 1997). 
Whether the more fundamental critique observers articulated against NEAP1, 
for example the neglecting in identification of causes of environmental 
degradation and destruction (see Larson, 1994), was accommodated for within 
NEAP2, is more questionable. In NEAP3 (2003-2008), the focus was switched 
towards the promotion of sustainable development. Over the years the main 
objective went from the management of biodiversity by the creation of a 
proper regulatory framework, to more involvement of government agencies 
and finally in the last phase more involvement of local people and emphasis on 
environmental financial mechanisms (Razafindralambo and Gaylord, 2006).
Gelose represents one version of the CBNRM (Community Based Natural 
Resource Management) vehicle in Madagascar. It includes three parties : the 
forest agency DEF, the municipality (the administrative lowest level where the 
forest belongs), and a community level forest association that was formed for 
this purpose. A second version of CBNRM in Madagascar is the GCF. In this 
version, the municipality only plays an indirect role (entering a contractual 
agreement with the forest agency). In the literature, Gelose is often linked to 
law 96-025 (see Sigogneau and Rajaspera, 1998 ; Antona et.al., 2004) though 
the text of the law only refers to the local management of natural renewable 
resources and not to locally guaranteed management which is the correct 
spelling of the abbreviation Gelose. Even a later decree (Décret 2000‑027) 
in which the responsibility of the basic community is stipulated, refers to 
the local management of natural resources. It appears to be a detail, but it is 
important to bear in mind that the wording ‘security’ or ‘guarantee’ in the 
local management regime (Gelose) is not in accordance with the text in the 
applied legislation.
In purely legal terms, another ambiguity appears in the legal text. Article 7 
rightly refers to a contract between the basic community (normally a village) 
and the municipality within the Gelose legal framework, and then proceeds 
by mentioning that such a contract only has a legal status if specified in the 
Gelose contract. In other words, the role of the municipality is reduced to 
one of providing support to the basic community, but without according any 
formal rights to the municipality as opposed to the rights of the community. 
Gelose becomes a bipartite contract, and then in reality there is no difference 
between the Gelose contract and the Swiss inspired GTC contract, we briefly 
mentioned in the beginning of the chapter.
We soon realized that completing Gelose/GCF contracts between the three 
signing parties (Forest Department-municipality-basic community) was the 
easy part (fig. 1). By the end of 2002, 250 communities had signed a transfer 
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of management contract (chapter by Ramamonjisoa and Rabemananjara). 
But, once the preparation phase is over, lack of monitoring and absence of 
provision of tangible benefits to the community are the reality, many villages 
have to face. So, assessing the state of the country’s forests, and exploring 
whether the collecting of forest products, land use patterns and income sources 
have changed since the introduction of Gelose/GCF contracts had a different 
meaning than seemed initially to be the case. We cannot hold the Malagasy 
Figure 1 – Map of study areas 
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experience in local management accountable for the three outcomes if the 
scope was rather limited at the start. Still, we are in a position to formulate a 
number of hypotheses which are discussed in the various chapters :
1) Deforestation is present even in zones, where the transfer of management 
of forest resources has been completed
2) The rules negotiated on the use of forest resources before the signing of 
a transfer of management contract are always reinterpreted by the local actors. 
3) Local community management evolves with the passing of time in 
accordance with the dynamic, local forces. 
4) Management transfers fail under external forces in the absence of local 
financial autonomy. 
5) The feasibility of management transfers may depend on the presence 
of a donor, if not funded by the government, especially during the execution 
of the project. 
6) Lack of alternatives to slash and burn agriculture (hatsaké) make local 
management contracts financially unsustainable 
7) The space of intervention does not always coincide with the boundaries 
of the communities as it is the local value system that defines the spatial unit 
of the management system. 
8) There are two opposing types of interpretation of conservation values. 
9) The destruction of the natural forest is a way to acquire related property 
rights. 
10) The success of management transfers depends on the inclusion of all 
the local actors in the negotiation process and is shaped by local conditions, 
inter alia the level of education and the possibility of enhancing forest 
resources. 
11) The tenure issue is only one among numerous causes of deforestation.
4 – How to characterize the local management of forest 
resources in Madagascar : Gelose
In Madagascar, the total forest loss is estimated at 9-15 % of the forest 
cover in 2005 compared with the 1990s, or at least 1 million hectares over 
the entire decade (Moser, 2008). One of the major mitigating measures, 
outside national parks and reserves, is the implementation of legislation 
authorizing the transfer of forest management. Once locals have obtained 
the management rights of the resources, they will pay attention to not 
depleting the resource base, or so goes the general argument in Madagascar 
or anywhere else in developing countries opting for the local management 
of natural/forest resources.
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However, a transfer of the management of natural resources seldom aims 
to fulfil one single objective. CBNRM is the broader concept. In one version, 
the overall objective is stated as : 
CBNRM can be considered a management strategy aiming to reduce poverty, 
conserve natural resources and promote good governance’ (Danida (Danish aid 
agency), 2007, p. 2).
We will deploy the term community forestry in the following to 
characterize the framework of Gelose/GCF. In the general debate on local 
forest initiatives, confusion reigns about definitions. Referring to definitions 
used by 12 major forestry initiatives, Rice et al. (2001) found considerable 
disagreement in terms of sustainability, socioeconomic and biodiversity 
criteria. In the absence of any clear definition, we will argue that community 
forestry separates itself from SFM (Sustainable Forest Management) by being 
less explicit with concern to long-term sustainability but more concerned with 
economic benefits accumulation and benefits sharing. 
Community forestry may be regarded as a process, gradually increasing 
the commitment of the communities and devolving the control of the state : 
1) Community participation in the decision-making process surrounding 
resource utilisation.
2) Government relinquishment of controlling forest areas to communities. 
3) Engagement of the communities in value-added activities. (Glasmeier 
and Farrigan (2005).
Prado (1995) distinguishes between three forms of transfer : 
1) forest handed over to communities for management, 
2) forests leased to communities for production ;
3) partnership between forestry agencies and communities to share 
benefits.
Substituting industrial timber companies with community-based forest 
enterprises seems to be a strategy adopted in the Philippines and in Albania. 
In India and Nepal, the strategy being promoted is based on partnership for 
benefit sharing. 
Various studies have addressed the benefit accumulation and the benefit 
sharing. Either from an equity perspective (rural communities gain a larger 
share) or from a cost-efficient perspective (common-property regime can 
increase economic benefits under certain conditions). A trade-off between 
the benefit sharing objective and the maximum benefit accumulation may 
develop but is not unavoidable (Castrén, 2005). Poor performance in benefit 
sharing could stem from uneven access to the most valuable resources. Based 
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on African experiences, Wily and Mbaya (2001) distinguish between benefit 
sharing and power sharing forest managements systems. They conclude 
from a study of 12 African countries that power sharing programs are more 
common than benefit sharing. The latter often fall prey to mood changes of the 
authorities (CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe being the clearest example). 
Gelose/GCF is a type of transfer in its early stage. Communities participate 
in decision making, but the state has reserved its right to cancel contracts 
and the forest tenureship de jure is not yet an issue for discussion. Examples 
of direct benefits drawn from forest exploitation are rare in Madagascar and 
mostly related to the collection of firewood (see the article by Muttenzer in 
this volume). Power sharing is a more appropriate notion by which to classify 
the management system in Madagascar. 
5 – What are the key concepts that our study examines ?
First, we will select a number of key concepts from the general debate 
on community forestry and compare them with the use in our study. What 
degree of congruence exists between the general debate and our observations, 
and where do we add to the general debate ? Second, we will refer to studies 
undertaken in Madagascar and try to find similarities or differences between 
our study and others.
a – Resources and resource size
Resources are classified into four groups : state property, private property, 
common property (or common-pool resources) or open-access property. 
In reality, property rights are seldom static and common property is not 
necessarily managed by a communal regime (Hulme and Murphree, 2001). 
Agrawal (2001, 2002) highlights the resource characteristics and the external 
factors. Factors affecting the management of the commons are divided 
into resource characteristics, group characteristics (boundaries, norms and 
heterogeneity), institutional arrangements (simple rules, graduated sanctions) 
and finally external factors (government supporting local authority and clear 
legal framework). A success in common property (in our case community 
forestry) may materialise if natural resources are characterised by low levels 
of mobility and are small in size, predictability and in relation to external 
factors low level of articulation with external markets. 
Not all observes agree on these characteristics. In a study from India, 
Misra and Kant (2004) show that collective action increases with the size of 
the forest. On the issue of community conservation, though different from 
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community forestry, Adams and Hulme (2001) equally find the resource ought 
to be large enough to gain support from the community. 
Our study does not claim to enter the debate on the resource size question 
in detail. Nevertheless, the article by Ramamonjisoa and Rabemananjara, 
analyzing Gelose from a commodity value chain angle, underscores the 
problem of community forestry in a case where marketing of the transformed 
resource is well organised (the agricultural commodities, maize and manioc, 
replacing the forest products). A high exposure to external markets for maize 
cropping is detrimental to the protection of the forest resource, which is in line 
with Agrawal’s argument.
b – Local policies of community forestry
Central to our approach is how various stakeholders perceive the 
management contract and how external stakeholders in the preparatory phase 
conceive which economic activities to promote. Rakoto analyses the approach 
adopted by the SAGE (Service d’Appui à la Gestion de l’Environnement / Office 
of Management Support in Environment) which mandate is to supervise the 
preparation leading up to the signing of a Gelose contract. If local customs are 
not well understood initially, the future of the contract is at stake. 
Interviewing villagers in India, Matta and Alavalapati (2006) observe 
major divergences in perceptions of the participations in the JMF (Joint Forest 
Management) program. A third of the households could not identify any reason 
to join the JFM program, and nearly 60 % of the villagers claimed not to 
have received any benefit. The article by Casse and Milhøj relates to a similar 
issue  : what are the advantages/disadvantages of Gelose from a participant 
perspective, and what would villagers prefer to include in future Gelose 
contracts. Conclusions stress the absence of tangible economic benefits, but 
villagers in our study area in Madagascar were still largely in favour of Gelose 
due to the indirect benefits the contract engendered (like better relations 
with DEF ; often frictions are present between local communities and forest 
authorities). Indirect benefits or noncash benefits can be important side-effects 
in community forestry or in community conservation projects. Salafsky et al. 
(2001) reach an analogous conclusion looking at community based enterprises 
within community conservation projects. Conservation in their case occurred 
regardless of the importance of cash benefits stakeholders were receiving. In 
our case, any attempt to link support to Gelose or to any particular kind of 
income increase also ended blind.
Stakeholder strategies are the cornerstone of most analyses of community 
forestry. Analyzing strategies is the main topic in Ranaivoson’s article. 
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The success in implementation of Gelose is broader than calibration of the 
deforestation rates. Ranaivoson starts by examining the results of satellite 
remote sensing images combined with on-the-ground observations to ascertain 
which villages have managed to save the forest (or achieving a slower 
deforestation rate), then goes on to discuss the strategies chosen by migrants 
compared with residents in managing the forests. In villages where there are 
continuous conflicts between migrants and residents, the Gelose contract was 
never completed, but more likely turned into a battlefield of rules for sharing 
land. In other villages, while demonstrating a declining deforestation rate, 
most of the surrounding forest has gone already. 
Heterogenity in the ethnical composition of the village has previously been 
seen as an impediment to collective management effectiveness. When asking 
villagers in Nepal about monitoring rules and penalty systems, translating 
the score into an ordinal scale (values), neither the study by Varughese and 
Ostrom (2001) nor the one by Adhikari and Lovett (2007) could demonstrate 
any association between heterogeneity and collective action. In this respect, 
Ranaivoson’s article is more in line with the traditional view of heterogeneity 
being an obstacle to collective action. Residents or migrants from the same 
family or village of origin dominate in villages classified as success stories. 
Attention needs to be paid to the fact that the general studies from Nepal were 
entirely based on subjective observations of the villagers’ own perceptions of 
rules and penalties, and thus conclusions could be biased. 
In the implementation of local strategies, Gelose is used as a means to 
reinforce and to legitimate the traditional land management system (dina). 
When the forest belongs to one family or a few families, migrants claim that 
they share the equivalent ethnical identity that normally only the residents 
hold, in order to get access to land. In other areas, when the local power 
structure is more balanced between migrants and residents, the Gelose contract 
never got signed. Gelose becomes of battlefield of opposing interests and the 
COBA (composition of the basic community) the instrument of the power 
struggle. Rakoto and Dieudonné describe these divergent strategies leading to 
the signature or non signature of Gelose contracts in their article. 
Oyono (2005a) looks upon decentralized forest management as a process 
having numerous negative effects. The committees in Cameroon are being 
taken over by literates and in some cases by young people with a better 
educational background than the average villager. In the words of Oyono :
‘the architects of decentralization have... cleared the way for damageable social 
distortions and conflicts’ (p. 326).
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Open confrontation between local villagers and chiefs is the natural 
outcome of the forest decentralisation process in Cameroon, according to 
Oyono. In Madagascar, Blanc-Palmard and Fauroux (2006) witness a similar 
process unfolding. They stress the consolidation of the existing power structure 
by the creation of artificial institutions (the COBAs) seized by those who are 
best at dialoguing with the donors (not necessarily the young people as in the 
Cameroon case). 
Compared to these studies, the article by Ranaivoson is less categorical 
in its conclusions, and adds further details to the discussion on local power 
and local management contracts. Gelose either consolidates an existing power 
structure (but with a positive impact on preservation of the forest), exposes 
unresolved conflicts or finally becomes a pure illusion (in cases where the 
forest has long gone). Blanc-Pamard in this volume raises another important 
issue concerning representation, beyond the internal power conflicts within 
community councils or within villages. The role of the external, non-signing 
stakeholders  : the municipality (in Gelose contracts the municipality is, on 
paper, a signing party), and the collectors of agricultural products. Conflicts 
between the village or community and the forest authorities, signing the 
transfer of management contracts, are inferior to conflicts between residents 
and migrants, between villages and between villages and the service providers, 
like the economically powerful collectors. In this sense, the transfer of 
management is an asymmetric management tool.
c – Tenureship
Neo-classical economic theory on natural resource management argues 
that a first-best solution would be to provide farmers with better incentives for 
conservation through a more secure land tenure system (Barbier and Burgess, 
2001 ; Deacon, 1999). In a report on poverty reduction and tropical forests, 
Chomitz (2007) of the World Bank points to forest tenure and community 
rights as determining conditions for success in community forestry. Leach, 
Mearns and Scoones (1997, p. 233) emphasize ‘environmental entitlements’ 
which are :
‘alternative sets of utilities derived from environmental goods and services 
over which social actors have legitimate effective command and which are 
instrumental in achieving well-being’. 
Gibson et al. (2000) argue that much of the theoretical foundation 
underpinning the debate on property rights assumes that there are only two kinds 
of property : state owned (public goods) and private owned (private goods). 
Reference is made to a study in Uganda showing that the lack of tenure cannot 
The international debate on forest management transfer and our contribution
23
explain the variation in forest conditions between five cases. Only enforcement 
rules linked to a certain mode of property rights can explain the variation. But 
even when property rights, enforcement and an additional condition on the 
appropriate-size of forest group are in place ; successful management might 
still not emerge. In another example from Ecuador, differences between user 
groups still affect the outcome of forest management, and in this case part of 
the forest is not managed (characterized by open-access). Based on a variety 
of case-studies, we know today that the provision of tenure security in itself 
is not a sufficient condition for better, less degrading forest management, and 
that local management or common-pool management under certain conditions 
can be an efficient management type.
Ranaivoson discusses three examples of ‘environmental entitlement’ 
in southwest Madagascar where the implementation of Gelose becomes 
instrumental in excluding migrants in one area, illusional in another (no 
forest left), and finally a means to exclude residents in a third case. In the 
last example, the forest is used as a parking space for cattle, and the Gelose 
arrangement serves to exclude the original population. In the first two 
examples, all available land is already parceled out to the residents, and 
Gelose simply endorses a de facto private property regime (i.e. Gelose is 
not really needed). In the last example, the forest is not parceled out, but the 
signing of a management agreement is utilized as a means of exclusion. Local 
enforcement, without any support from government agencies is the key to 
the protection, in one case a de facto private property regime, in another a 
common-pool management regime. In this interpretation, Gelose does not 
change the rules, and the official cadastral recognition of property has only 
confirmed traditional rights. Unfortunately, the prospect of acquiring official 
recognition by land clearing has led to an increase in deforestation in villages 
where there were initial conflicts. The allocation of formal property rights 
seems to be have worsened the situation for forest protection, at least in south-
west Madagascar, due to the combination of internal conflicts and lack of 
monitoring and enforcement of forest regulations.
Muttenzer compares two villages in western Madagascar saying that 
participation in the charcoal burners’ association is crucial where Gelose 
officially has sanctioned the association’s activities. Individual customary 
rights to land require membership of the association. In the village without 
a Gelose contract participation in the burner association is not particularly 
attractive. Comparing the two articles by Ranaivoson and Muttenzer reveals 
that Gelose offers a weak institutional framework for local forest management, 
and when the natural resource represents a valuable economic good (firewood 
supply), signing a Gelose contract can have implications for the role of local 
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forest user groups (the burner association). Yet, Gelose will fail in protecting 
the forest. Open-access in one case (without the Gelose contract), a de 
facto private property regime in another, the outcome is still an increase in 
deforestation. Only when the resource is not an economic asset, can Gelose be 
used as an instrument to protect the forest.
Our study lends support to the argument by Gibson et al. (2000) that 
common-pool management is an option, though hard to determine whether 
it is an efficient mode of management. Enforcement rules are almost absent 
in any of our cases ; but we claim that common-pool management may be a 
feasible option, even when enforcement rules are weak.
d – Community forestry compared to other management types
An important on-going debate, to which the book adds its proper 
contribution, concerns the effectiveness of local management of forest 
compared to strict protected areas. 
In a study of 163 forests in 13 countries, based on interviews of hired 
foresters and of forest user groups (asking questions about forest rules), Hayes 
(2006) rejects the statement that parks are better than non-parks to protect the 
forest. She criticizes another study by Bruner et al. (2001) for basing their 
positive conclusion about the effectiveness of parks on two methodological 
shortcomings  : park officials were those who were interviewed (biased 
sample), and they failed to compare with other management types. As opposed 
to the study by Bruner et al. (2001), her results show no significant difference 
in vegetation densities between the two categories. So, we could accept 
that community forest management is one option in the search for forest 
protection. Case-studies are not numerous but on the increase. Nagendra and 
Gokhale (2008) compare various management types (community forestry, 
buffer zones, Joint Forest Management in India, and leaseholds) concluding 
that both community forestry and buffer zones records are positive in terms of 
regeneration of forest cover and improvement in biomass. Tucker et al. (2007) 
focus on community forestry management compared to privately owned 
forests in Guatemala and Honduras and argue that the nutrient concentration 
and institutional sanctions against offenders work better on private forest land. 
Comparing a local community forest area with a natural reserve in Mexico 
(corridor), Ellis and Porter-Bolland (2008) demonstrate that the protected area 
status in the corridor did not halt the deforestation process, and in this respect 
the community forest experience was more positive. 
Sunderlin et al. (2008) challenge the conventional approach to protection, 
and argue : 
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This approach to forest conservation has negative effects on the livelihoods, 
wellbeing, health, and culture of millions of people excluded from forest areas 
(ibid., p. 20). 
However, to deduce from these facts that local management of forest 
resources is also good news for forest protection in general constitutes which 
is yet another issue, we return to later (cf. section success or failure). 
Bertrand et al. are concerned with both the non-effectiveness of 
national parks in Madagascar (rare plant species are disappearing), lack 
of legal sanctions against offenders in national parks, and finally the way 
environmental NGOs allegedly take over the agenda in the communities 
enjoying local management contracts (Gelose or GCF), turning the contracts 
into pure protection arrangements. Why opt for more protected areas, if 
they are not effective  ? Local management contracts need to show their 
effectiveness and include commercialisation opportunities for community 
members, based on the exploitation of forest products. In order to allow for 
this to happen, the lip-service of the NGOs to community projects should be 
avoided (Hutton et al., 2005, also mention this problem of bias in the NGO 
role as intermediate agency). 
Blanc-Pamard perceives the bordering process in the regional land use 
planning between areas of protection compared to areas of community forestry 
as a threat to both the conservation efforts and efforts to sustain villagers’ income 
from forest products. Distortions are the rule, not the exception. In one forest 
area, the conservation zone includes a section where human instigated fires 
usually happen once in a while, while the government officials have assigned 
primary, intact forest patches to be part of the community forestry zone. 
Applying an often distorted territorial zoning policy triggers simultaneously 
a change in the legitimizing status of land areas among villagers. Those with 
land in newly gazetted protected areas and those with little land acquisitions at 
the onset of the transfer of management process are likely to loose out.
From an overall planning perspective, it might be less evident how 
to assign protected areas compared to areas of community management 
(where exploitation under regulation is authorized). Even if the conclusion 
of Bertrand et al. sounds logical and reasonable (new protected areas should 
exclude human activities, but where humans are already settled pure protection 
as a management option ought to be ruled out), biologists have reported that 
macro-studies exhibit a correlation between human densities and animal 
richness (biodiversity hotspots) worldwide, consequently conflicts over the 
‘correct’ zoning policy will continue to emerge (Balmford et al., 2001 ; Arújo 
and Rahbek, 2007). One explanation of the correlation could be the availability 
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of energy both for humans and animals is abundant in these places, so humans 
and animals alike tend to conquer the same habitats. 
e – Decentralization
Ribot et al. (2006) show how central government in countries so diverse 
as Senegal, Uganda, Nepal, Indonesia, Bolivia and Nicaragua use strategies to 
obstruct the decentralisation process of forest resource management. 
In Senegal, a new code authorizes local councils to decide whether 
commercial production ought to take place, but the central government still 
forced the councils to continue commercial exploitation, even when they 
express a will to stop the logging. In Nepal, important forest areas were handed 
over to local management (forest user groups), though the most valuable 
commercial forests continued to be governed under the auspices of the central 
government. Municipalities in Nicaragua may be unaware of the number of 
logging operations authorized by central government. A common problem is :
the devolution of management responsibilities without corresponding funds to 
carry them out.
Another means is to control the territory over which local authorities 
have the right to impose their proper rules, as in Bolivia where only 20 % of 
the total forest area is subject to local jurisdiction. Finally, insisting on legal 
ambiguities during the decentralisation process is the third major pillow in the 
half-hearted decentralisation process.
Li (2002, p. 266), looking at the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, 
argues that :
CBNRM, rather than rolling back the state and reducing official interference in 
local affairs, is a vehicle for realigning the relationship between the state and 
upland citizens.
The 1999 Forest Law in Indonesia recognises the category of customary 
forest but still lists it as a component of the national forest estate, under 
the control of the Department of Forestry. Referring to a specific law, Li 
states that community forestry is a right to use the forest approved by the 
Department of Forests, while not extending a formal recognition of locals’ 
already existing forest rights. 
Muttenzer ties the transfer of management of forest resources to the 
marketing of charcoal. The COBAs in this case consist of producers of 
charcoal with a keen interest in gaining the responsibility for management. 
Contrary to many other community forest projects in Madagascar, the Gelose 
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contract in western Madagascar near a major national park (Antkarafantsika) 
includes economic benefits. Charcoal producers have the right to exploit the 
natural forests around the national parks in a sustainable manner and to market 
the charcoal. Muttenzer claims sustainability (or better restrictions in former 
unlimited exploitation) is another illusion of Gelose. Charcoal procedures 
have no legitimacy to impose the new, stricter rules on any actor in the 
charcoal value chain, not the least when politicians and foreigners continue 
requesting cheap energy supplies to cover the demand of urban consumers 
and tourists. Furthermore, under the surface of an overall strategy, defined by 
the Malagasy state, to reconcile development and conservation objectives, the 
charcoal production chain has much broader functions, apart from securing 
cheap energy supply to the district capital of Mahajanga. Functions including 
the tasks of collecting low rather symbolic taxes and, on behalf of government, 
to regulate land-tenure issues among migrants who settle on previously 
unoccupied land. 
The Gelose charcoal producers’ control of migrants’ occupation of land 
and collect taxes in the adjacent forests to the national park, but the park 
itself is still under the auspices of the national park authorities (ANGAP), 
and only three forests around the national park are given local management 
contracts. In that respect, Madagascar aspires to become yet another example 
of ‘recentralizing while decentralizing’. The central authorities in Madagascar 
are still in control of the territory, the amount of locally collected taxes, as in the 
cases of Bolivia and Nepal, and the government passed a legal framework in 
which ambiguities persist. Complaints about not respecting Gelose rules from 
non-members of the basic community cannot be lodged formally anywhere, 
neither with the forest authorities nor with the local courts. 
f – Success or failure
Almost any researcher dealing with community forestry puts forward the 
question of success or not  : referring to an ecological definition (e.g. forest 
cover), an economic definition (e.g. income from forest products) or a social/
distributional definition (e.g. which group of stakeholders gains economically 
from community forestry arrangements). 
What is striking is the little evidence-based knowledge one can deduce 
from the enormous number of studies ; this is partly explained by the very 
broad and all-encompassing definition of community forestry or in general 
terms CBNRM. 
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As Blaikie (2006, p. 1954) states :
the attractiveness of CBNRM rides on a heterogenous set of theories and 
sentiments’ and ‘CBNRM is porous, can absorb all manner of different agendas, 
and rich in the variety of benefits it promises, and there appears to be ‘something 
in it for everybody.
The overall account is negative, concludes Blaikie referring to one single 
evaluation of 14 case studies in eight countries of Africa by Shacklenton and 
Campbell (2001). Villagers do not gain anything from CBNRM projects, but 
the deployed methodology in the evaluation report is regrettably not discussed 
explicitly by Blaikie.
A review of success or failure in community forestry, measured in 
ecological terms by slower deforestation rates or increase in biomass, is 
inconclusive (remember Blaikie does not claim to address the ecological issue). 
Casse and Milhøj (2011) found no systematic correlation between presence of 
community forestry projects and lower deforestation rates/increase in biomass 
or improved forest conditions, reviewing approximately 100 case-studies in 
developing countries. Variables in community forestry covered accountability 
(upwards, downwards), degree of power devolution and degree of local 
collective action (sanctions towards members/non-members). Closest to 
showing significance was the degree of local collective action. The only other 
existing meta-study suggests a positive correlation between tenure security or 
clearly defined boundaries on the one hand, and success in community forestry 
on the other (Pagdee et al., 2006). Unfortunately, the two meta-studies are not 
entirely compatible, since Pagdee et al. define success as any of the three 
attributes : ecological sustainability, social equity, and economic efficiency.
According to the Danida definition of CBNRM, other concepts of 
measuring success/failure may come into play. In the absence of any proper 
review based on alternative concepts (economic benefits or more equal 
distribution of benefits), we cannot conclude as categorically as in the case of 
applying the ecological condition. Various studies suggest economic benefits, 
at least in India and Nepal, as being significant in forests subject to local 
collective actions (Chakraborty, 2001 on Nepal ; Nino-Murcia, 2006 on India). 
Nevertheless, major questions remain : Are the case-studies representative for 
the status of community forest projects in these two countries (in Nepal 20 % 
of the entire forest area is controlled by communities, Shresta and McManus, 
2007) and do community forests perform better in accessibility to potential 
economic benefits than state controlled forests ? 
Since conservation or access to economic benefits might be a too narrow 
remit for judging community forestry a success, a number of studies have 
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addressed the third definition of success, namely the issue of distribution 
(closely linked to poverty alleviation in the Danida definition). Suggesting 
according to various studies, not surprisingly, that local elites tend to siphon off 
the benefits generated in community forests (Iversen et al., 2006 and Adhikari, 
2005 on Nepal ; Oyono, 2005b on Cameroon). Whatever the success criterion 
applied (ecological, economic or distributional), little knowledge related to 
explaining success is accumulated in developing countries’ experiences in 
community forestry.
II – Success or failure in our study
Success Nearly 
success
Neither Nearly failure Failure
- Razafy Fara 
(if only changes 
in deforestation 
rates are 
considered)
- Bertrand et al. 
(compared to 
alternative of 
pure protection)
-Blanc-Pamard 
(provided 
a broader 
approach is 
adopted)
- Ranaivoson
- Casse & 
Milhøj
- Muttenzer
- Rakoto/Dieudonné
- Rakoto
- Ramamonjisoa/
Rabemananjara
Razafy Fara : Success is claimed, because of no or insignificant increase 
in the deforestation rate in areas under Gelose management. Using the 
interpretation of satellite photos, the author detects a slow or no increase in the 
deforestation rate from the year 2000 to 2005. The study is limited to our main 
research area in south-west Madagascar. However, comparing the satellite 
photos with ground verification shows various signs of forest degradation or 
illegal logging activities. In view of this important modification of the main 
observation of no or little deforestation, the author concludes prudently that 
it would be premature to argue that the granting of autonomy to COBAs is 
effective. Supporting this conclusion the author finally refers to the role of the 
COBAs not always being clearly defined. 
Ranaivoson : While the results of measuring the forest extension are 
important, the author adds other criteria to the definition of failure villages : 
where the forest is detained by one single person, where the signature on the 
Table 1 – Success or failure of GELOSE contracts, overall assessment by the 
various authors 
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contract is still pending and a final case where the forest has disappeared. In 
the end, only four out of 11 villages in our main research area, in southwest 
Madagascar, could be considered successful in protecting the forest. Finally, 
the author observes signs of overexploitation of adjacent forests to those 
chosen for Gelose rules, replacing the pressure on the forest to non protected 
forests (open access forests).
Bertrand et al. : Local forest management contracts have been hijacked by 
the environmental NGOs and most of the transfers of management contracts do 
not authorize commercial exploitation of forest products. The result is illegal 
logging and slash-and burn practices within the boundaries of the area under 
community forestry. However, the creation of more protected areas does not 
represent the ideal solution since the record of national parks in Madagascar is 
far from convincing (due to rapid disappearance or even extinction of rare and 
valuable plant species). A better future option is to distinguish clearly between 
the criteria of selection of protected areas compared to community forests. In 
the long run it could turn out to the benefit of community forest experiences.
Blanc-Pamard : Comprehension of successes and failures in community 
forestry is a challenge. Often the criteria of zoning of community land as 
compared to protected areas are ambiguous, the community councils (COBAs) 
are overtaken by those already in power, and the contracts lack inclusion of 
external stakeholders. A strategy for sustainable development could replace 
the asymmetric transfer of the management model in which conflicts and 
contradictions internally in communities and in dealings with authorities 
and collectors are acknowledged. Recognition of a conflict or conflicts is a 
first step towards identification of an adequate solution to the rural livelihood 
problems. 
Casse & Milhøj : The authors collected household based data on villagers’ 
perceptions of advantages and weaknesses of the Gelose contracts in 11 villages 
in south-west Madagascar, and transforming the qualitative responses into 
category data yield not significant differences among households in success 
villages compared to failure villages. Compared to the criteria of Razy Fara 
and those of Ranaivoson, the authors define eight failures villages and three 
success villages based on villagers’ opinion as to whether the actual Gelose 
contract is sufficient or not. A third of all households, regardless of being 
located in success or failure villages, request access to non-managed forest 
areas, where they can, if needed, encroach on the forest resources without 
restrictions. The transfer of management model in Madagascar, at least in 
this part of the country, did not change significantly the attitude of villagers 
towards conservation of the forest. However, we observed that, despite lack 
of economic benefits embraced in the Gelose contacts, the majority of the 
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households claim that they will refrain from transforming the forest (even 
forest not included in the Gelose contracts). So the attitude of today may 
change tomorrow.
Rakoto and Dieudonné : Due to persistent conflicts over land Gelose 
could represent a more or less legal vehicle to the control of land. The author 
argues in favor of aligning the poverty reduction strategies to the conservation 
efforts, and the originality of Gelose appears not as a means to conserve the 
forest, but rather as in instrument to acquire control of space or land by local 
inhabitants. In that logic, Gelose is a half success.
Muttenzer : Villages depending on income from charcoal trade around 
a national park in north-west Madagascar did not achieve a higher level 
of sustainability in production, just by signing a Gelose contract. The 
advantage of the Gelose contract is confined to the indirect gain following 
the implicit official recognition of former illegal settlement (clearing of forest 
area). Gelose has become an instrument for occupants of land (forested or 
deforested) to prove a more formal access right to land. The quota system of 
charcoal production in the north-west, in line with an objective of ensuring 
long term sustainability, was compounded by the overall increasing demand 
for firewood at the provincial capital (Mahajanga). In the overall assessment, 
Gelose is closer to being regarded a failure, as it does not respond to any 
criteria of sustainability.
Rakoto  : Examining the situation in central Madagascar, the transfer 
of management rights should be the easiest case of all those included in the 
study. The forest is already protected for social and religious reasons, and the 
Gelose contract merely legalized an existing historical customary right to the 
forest. However, the architects of the Gelose contract misinterpreted the site 
specific restrictions, excluding any income-generating activity to be based on 
the forest resources, by proposing an eco-tourism venture. In a longer term 
perspective, Gelose could turn into a straight failure, since no economic long-
term alternatives were accommodated in the contract. In conclusion, the future 
looks quite bleak.
Ramamonjisoa and Rabemananjara : The communities cannot resist the 
option of transforming the forest into agricultural land since the total amount 
allocated to facilitate the process of transfer of management is less than 6 
% of the annual estimated income from activities replacing the forest. The 
option of clearing is by far more economically attractive than to conserve 
the forest. Worsening observation is the quasi-total external absorption of the 
Gelose allocations by consultants or the facilitating agency SAGE with almost 
no financial resources left for those who are the direct beneficiaries. On top 
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of that, the local forest authorities do not achieve any monetary compensation 
for the work they invest in drawing up the transfer of management contracts. 
Gelose is a failure to the two authors.
The authors of the book disagree on the main conclusion, even when 
focusing on the same study area. The reason being that community forestry 
(Gelose/GCF) is supposed to fulfil several targets, even if the legal context 
accentuates sustainable production (see below). Several targets leave room for 
different interpretations. Razafy Fara concentrates her analysis on the forest 
cover in the Gelose managed forest areas, whereas Ranaivoson privileges 
articulation of social conflicts as the crucial issue, and these authors even differ 
in their respective assessments. The villagers’ right to more or less unlimited 
access to the forest is the crucial factor in the interpretation of Dieudonné, 
Muttenzer and Rakoto. The zoning of exploitable forests compared to 
protected areas, and bias in election criteria to the community councils were 
the criteria used in Blanc-Pamard’s analysis. Statistical significant differences 
in comparing villagers’ behaviour and interest in local management are the 
focus of Casse and Milhøj’s analysis. The lack of alternatives offered by 
Gelose is the corner issue of Ramamonjisoa & Rabemananjara’s study. Closely 
related is the criteria of Bertrand et al. on how to distinguish community forest 
areas from protected areas, if most community contracts are to comply with a 
protection objective only. Had the overall aim of Gelose and the definitions of 
community forestry been less ambiguous, our interpretation would certainly 
have been more convergent. 
1 – Comparing our study to other studies of community 
forestry in Madagascar
What are the conclusions of studies on community forestry in Madagascar ? 
Not surprisingly, similar weaknesses in the general literature on community 
forestry are replicated in a Malagasy context. 
a – Governance 
Only one study compares different forest governance systems in the 
same publication (McConnell and Sweeney, 2005). The authors compare six 
forests, one under pure state control, a private forest and three community 
forest projects and finally a community plantation. Using satellite images 
comparison for a period of 1985-2000, they show differences in forest cover 
performance in favour of the community forests. However, caution is required 
before clear conclusions are deduced from the study. The deforestation rates 
decline observed in the community forests projects relate to the last five years 
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of the entire period (1995-2000) for which sub-period data is not available 
in the state or in the private forest areas. In addition, due to the foreign aid 
allocation to the community projects, we know little about long-term financial 
viability. What will happen, once the NGOs withdraw their funding  ? Our 
article on deforestation rates by Razafy Fara covers the same period for all 
Gelose forests (2000-2005), so it does not suffer from the same weakness. 
In addition an important modification of the interpretation of satellite photos 
was produced by checking with ground verification, which we do not find in 
McConnell and Sweeney’s study. However, our study does not compare the 
Gelose forests with other forest management types. 
Contemplating the Gelose governance framework, Antona et al. (2004) 
voice the following general conclusions : When stakes are high for government, 
like regulation inside national parks, Gelose contracts are not extended 
to communities. Transferred resources are mostly over-exploited, usually 
related to non-commercial user rights as far as timber and forest resources are 
concerned and important to local people only, not to government. Gelose rules 
either confirm de facto rules (traditional dina rules) or raise conflicts. Rules 
are effective when they constrain a minority of members or are supported by 
a majority. In south-west Madagascar, confusion reigns about the user rights 
in Gelose  : 65 % claimed there were no rights of exploitation, while 32 % 
answered that they could collect firewood and timber (Casse and Milhøj). 
Stating the legal framework as is found in the work of Antona et al. (2004) is 
maybe less crucial than the examination of the local perception of their rights :
We have learned that whether individuals are motivated to think about engaging 
in collective action is strongly affected by their perceptions of the conditions of 
a resource – not by the actual condition’, (Poteete and Orstrom, 2004, p. 228). 
As mentioned above the chapters by Razafy Fara and Ranaivoson reckon at 
least one more potential outcome of Gelose contracts, apart from confirmation 
or exposing/raising conflicts, namely the option of Gelose creating an illusion. 
Few proper evaluations of Gelose are published. According to a study 
of 25 Gelose contracts (Resolve Conseil, 2005) Gelose is a success, as 16 
villages in which Gelose rules are applied demonstrated signs of reduction in 
bush fires, while the involved households have increased their revenue. Pollini 
(2007) notes that the measure of bush fire frequencies was undertaken shortly 
after a major and repressive anti-fire campaign in 2002, so it is questionable 
whether changes can be linked to changes in forest management types only. 
Finally, the author objects that the real motivation of villagers to cut down 
bush fires is not fully explained. The final version of the evaluation report 
(Montagne et al., 2007) reflects an approach geared towards suggestions about 
improvements in future local management contracts. The integration of forest 
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management contracts into regional plans, a focus on ecosystem planning, 
and proper base-line studies of the communities prior to contract formulation, 
are the recommendations issued in the final report. The greatest challenge 
appears in the actual mismatch in expectations between villagers and external 
organisations, assisting in contract preparations (NGOs or SAGE), that 
is the overall purpose with the transfer better protection of forest or better 
income-generating activities to communities ? 
b – Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses
Only one study has attempted an economic analysis of Gelose contracts 
(Hockley and Andriamarovololona, 2007) interviewing members of six basic 
communities in eastern Madagascar. The study correctly points out that 
external donors may still prefer community forest projects, even in the absence 
of win-win situations (both the environment and the economy are better off 
after the transfer of management) if the conservation is more cost-effective in 
this type of forest governance compared to alternatives. 
The USAID study underscores the disappointment among basic 
community members after the initial contracts were signed. No monitoring 
followed, and lack of (in their case) promised development assistance was 
the general picture. Despite the absence of backing from the state authorities, 
four out of six basic communities exclude intruders and report illegal activities 
to the forest authorities. This behaviour might be weakened in the future as 
external organisations do not provide any support. Casse and Milhøj report 
similar problems in south-west Madagascar (72 % of the households express a 
preference for military control of access to the community forests).
While cost-effectiveness studies, comparing community forestry with 
ICDP or national parks, are few, more documentation is available on the 
question of opportunity costs of conservation. Even in Madagascar. In a 
study of linking two minor reserves with a major national park in eastern 
Madagascar (Ranomafana) in a corridor of conservation, Hockley and 
Razafindralambo (2006) estimated the global net value to be positive (more 
than $ 300 m), almost break-even at the national level and a substantial 
negative value to the local communities  ($ 30-50 m). At the national level, 
timber value and eco-tourism benefits are included. At the international 
level, carbon sequestration and bioprospecting are included. This conclusion 
confirms the general opinion worldwide that the costs are borne by the locals, 
while the tourist industry and international conservation organisations reap 
the benefits of nature protection. We restrict the following discussion to the 
estimates of opportunity costs. Figures from various studies are given below. 
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It is obviously extremely difficult to estimate the ‘correct’ opportunity costs 
based on so diverse calculations. 
Carret and Loyer (2003) estimate the land productivity at 0.5 tonne of 
paddy (rice) per hectare per year and multiply this figure with a net price of $ 
160 per hectare. The productivity approximation is fixed at quite a low level. In 
Casse and Milhøj the gross income from maize, based on data from a household 
survey, averages $ 340 per hectare, which is much closer to the estimate of 
Ramamonjisoa and Rabemananjara. Data are collected independently in the 
two articles. Carett and Loyer (2003) restrict their analysis to the yield the first 
year after deforestation, while Ramamonjisoa and Rabemananjara calculate 
an average for the first three years after deforestation, when the soil is still 
fertile. This last approach appears more correct than the estimation offered by 
Carret and Loyer (2003).
Product / Activity Value Source Comment
*Rice (NPV) $ 40 per 
household
Ferraro (2002) A 1991-1992 household 
survey (Eastern), 5 % 
discount rate
*Slash-and- burn 
agriculture
$ 85 per 
household
Minten (2003) A 2003 household 
survey (Northwest), 5 
% discount rate
*Willingness to 
abandon forest use
$ 177 per 
household
Minten (2003) A 2003 household 
survey (Northwest), 5 
% discount rate
*Slash-and-burn 
(NPV) agriculture
$ 520 per 
household
Hockley and 
Razafindralambo 
(2006)
Values are taken from 
various other studies 
and presented in 2005
*Slash-and-burn 
agriculture
$ 80 per hectare Carret and Loyer 
(2003)
National average
*Slash-and-burn 
agriculture (3 years)
$ 280 per hectare 
(average per 
year) or $ 840 per 
hectare
Our study Interviews of farmers 
(Southwest). Figures 
are collected in 2006
Looking at the other major studies, the main difference between the 
study by Carret and Loyer (2003) and the one undertaken by Hockley and 
Razafindralambo (2006) is the calculation of the hydrological benefits of forest 
protection. Whereas the first two authors claim that these benefits will level 
out the opportunity costs of less agricultural income, because of conservation 
plans, the second author team arrives at a figure of only $ 40 (NPV). A figure 
Table 2 – Estimates of opportunity costs of agricultural production in 
Madagascar, various years (NVP: Net Present Value)
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which is obviously inferior to the opportunity cost estimation. The discussion 
will not be extended here, only it seems that Carrett and Loyer (2003) made an 
effort to value the costs of protection at the lower end. Donors might be eager 
to adjust the real costs of conservation downwards.
Returning to the question of cost-efficiency in Gelose compared to 
other types of forest governance, no such study has yet been conducted in 
Madagascar. Prior to such a study, planners and researchers will need to 
ascertain whether community forests are as cost-efficient or effective in 
protection as national parks. Furthermore, we would like to be in a position to 
better determine the support or non-support from the forest authorities, even 
in the case where the economic rationale of Gelose could be enhanced by 
increasing the number of income-generating activities. These are activities 
which help cutting the substantial opportunity costs of conservation (in 
general linked to foregone revenues from agricultural production). In other 
words, buying off the contentment of the farmers through the introduction 
of economic alternatives might help only halfway if the forest authorities are 
still against the entire idea of forest management devolution. Above, in the 
section on ‘Changing legal status’, we referred, among others, to the study by 
Hayes (2006) on the effectiveness of parks compared to other management 
types concluding that parks are not any more effective than non-parks in 
terms of vegetation densities. Cost-effectiveness in comparing various forest 
management types does not yet seem to be a major issue in the international 
research agenda on community forestry. 
Only one study in Madagascar has focused on the support from the forest 
authorities in community forestry projects (Raik and Decker, 2007). The 
authors classify actors on the ground, in the implementation of a GCF project 
(the municipality does not sign as in the case of Gelose), into three groups : the 
basic community, the forest agency and the conservation NGO (facilitating the 
contracting process). The forest agency is the least satisfied among the three 
parties with the transfer of management to communities. Lack of transparency, 
corruption within the communities with permits of exploitation and failure to 
protect the forests in western Madagascar (Menabe region) from illegal timber 
harvests are the main reasons given. Muttenzer also reports a negative opinion, 
in the eyes of national park agents, of charcoal burners in buffer zones around 
a park in western Madagascar (Ankarafantsika). Indian foresters share this 
opinion when asked about their perception of the JFM program in India (Sood 
and Gupta, 2006). Contrary to the Malagasy foresters, the Indians name the 
communication gap between field staff and the central forest department in 
New Delphi as the most important reason, in their view, for failures of JFM. 
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We close the discussion on cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses by 
pointing out that opportunity costs are probably substantial, and community 
forestry projects (Gelose or GCF) have failed to compensate for the loss of 
income. National parks or ICDP enforce stricter rules than Gelose, so the 
opportunity costs are higher here (adding opportunity costs of exploitation 
of wood products). However, a trade off exists between opportunity costs and 
support from the forest agency. When opportunity costs in community forestry 
projects decline compared to more pure conservation projects, the resistance 
of the forest agency increases.
c – Local perceptions of ICDP and Gelose
Peters (1999) sees the lack of an ex ante examination of the impact of 
exclusionary policy of local economic activities within the national park 
(Ranomafana in eastern Madagascar) as the major impediment to creating 
national parks and buffer zones (ICDP). A later study refines the understanding 
of local reactions by stressing the need for informal contacts between national 
park staff and locals as a means to overcome conflicts (Ormsby and Kaplin, 
2005). However, external pressure on illegal harvesting of rosewood in this 
case (Masoala in northern Madagascar) poses a large challenge such as 
the pressure for cheap firewood supply in the buffer zones (ICDP) around 
Ankarafantsika in western Madagascar (Muttenzer). Comparing the attitudes 
towards the national parks, the villagers’ perception of national parks might 
not be uniform. In a study of people living close to three national parks, 
the population around Masoala (north Madagascar) demonstrated more 
support than in the two other buffer zones to national parks (Andohahela 
in south and Ranomafana in eastern Madagascar). The result was obtained 
by comparing target villages (ICDP) with non target villages in the three 
places (Marcus, 2001). One explanation suggested in the study refers to the 
tourism sector, being more developed in Ranomafana (close to the capital in 
Madagascar : Antananarivo).
In a final study from central Madagascar, Klein et al. (2007) argue in favour 
of a return to the old ‘fortress model’ of pure conservation projects. An ICDP 
failed when eucalyptus nurseries and small coffee plantations were burned. 
The development projects did not match the local priorities (no shortage of 
firewood) and targeting subsistence farmers will have no mitigating effect of 
the major threats like runaway fires to clear land for cattle rearing. While 
arguments showing the failure of ICDP in this case look convincing, the article 
could have gained from a more general review of ICDP in Madagascar, before 
declaring the entire ICDP model wrong and the implementation flawed.
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Blanc-Pamard and Rakoto (2007) offer an interesting study looking at a 
GCF project in eastern Madagascar, viewing local management through the 
lenses of the villagers. The spatial limits of the GCF project, the close-by 
national park (Ranomafana) and the territories of the various local ethnicities 
demonstrate a seldom seen visual interpretation of the challenges of the transfer 
of management to local communities. The authors claim that conservation 
restrictions on traditional use of forest resources have accelerated the 
transformation of the forest in valleys to rice fields. The GCF contract provides 
no proposal to the local practice of valorisation of land through deforestation, 
claiming user rights to the now cleared land plot. However, the authors offer 
no alternatives to reconciliation of the conservation need of a corridor between 
national parks and the local need for access to the forest.
According to Muttenzer and Rakoto, Gelose constitutes a relative failure, 
since no economic alternatives are offered and in the one case, charcoal 
production to supply the district capital in north-western Madagascar 
(Mahajanga) has proven an unsustainable business. In the case of central 
Madagascar, the forest is already protected because of its religious values, and 
the question is more whether lack of economic alternatives to slash-and-burn 
agriculture will translate into a pressure, and one day replace the social values 
of the forest. In the short run, locals do not write off the Gelose approach, 
since they gain in other respects. An advantage to the local population is the 
legitimization of the conquest of former forest land for charcoal production 
(Muttenzer), and the provision of a collateral guarantee to be used for credit 
requests from villagers (Rakoto). 
d – Weaknesses of our study
The major weakness is the absence of comparison with other types of 
forest management in Madagascar. In particular, we still lack information of 
the level of biodiversity in the Gelose forests compared to other forest types. 
The evaluation of community forestry experiences will have to address the 
question of biodiversity if compared with pros and cons of the establishment 
of national parks. In a situation of scarce financial resources, a community 
forestry concept in some format, Gelose or not, may still be required in 
Madagascar. If the Malagasy government agencies in exchange for recognition 
of customary rights attain forest protection at very low costs, the idea of Gelose 
might not be entirely futile. Comparing various types of forest management 
in terms of advantages and disadvantages then becomes the cornerstone of 
decision making. Open access is the worst scenario in forest protection terms, 
so a certain degree of deforestation or degradation, by recognition of illegal 
settlement, might be acceptable when a given forest area appears low on the 
national priority list. When, nonetheless, conflicts between ethnic groups 
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are severe and none of them are in a majority, community forestry is not the 
adequate approach to forest conservation according to our study. 
Closely related to the issue of comparative studies is the spatial dimension. 
Several of the authors point out that protection in one forest may be replaced 
by more pressure in another forest area (the substitution problem). We are not 
certain if this pattern is common or a fact exclusive to a minority of villages of 
conflicts. We lean more towards the first version, but our study cannot confirm 
it. Linking social variables to forest management in a spatial context is a 
challenge that further studies will have to consider.
A final shortcoming in our approach is the lack of a more profound 
comprehension of why donors and the Malagasy government embarked on the 
entire idea of a forest management decentralisation process. Allocating huge 
funds to the implementation stage of Gelose, but without any budget left for 
monitoring the results. Neither the legal text nor the Gelose contacts included 
any proposals to villagers of alternative income sources to what the government 
and the donors considered the prevailing unsustainable forest exploitation. 
Why did the government or the donors not offer monetary compensation for 
the loss of income from extractive activities like logging or more important : 
agricultural income ? 
*
Studies of the local management of forest resources : the 
general debate
Closing this introduction, we emphasize the implications of this study for 
the general debate. We believe no analysis, in a scientific paper or as a more 
practical exercise, should narrow the scope of evaluation to just one main 
criterion. The local management of forest resources is about how to identify 
practical tools to obtain conservation in some simultaneously with increasing 
the social and economic benefits accrued to local people (resource access). If 
binding these two ends together is impossible in a given setting, the researcher 
or the practitioner ought to state it clearly and not conceal the stalemate by 
only favouring one single aspect in his/her analysis. A local contract might 
be a failure on all accounts or may be successful in partial protection or in 
partially benefiting local people, or finally in rare cases a success both in 
environmental and economic/social terms. The analysis becomes even more 
complicated if we insist that the local management regime is also to meet a 
criterion of cost-effectiveness (from a planning perspective).
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In order to safeguard biodiversity, there is a need to promote the demarcation 
and protection of indigenous territories which have high conservation value 
and to legally recognize the conservation and sustainable use efforts of 
communities through secure land tenure and community property rights. 
The real tragedy is the wishful thinking that local management is a panacea 
for reconciling conservation and development criteria. We do find very few 
examples, worldwide and in Madagascar, where both criteria are met. Nepal 
is often hailed as such an example, but often lack of control groups in various 
studies make positive observations (i.e. in forest cover or in community profits) 
difficult to link exclusively to the presence of a local management contract 
of forest (Casse and Milhøj, 2011). Vermeulen and Sheil (2007) talk about 
shared conservation values, strong basis for practice (‘living within ecological 
limits’), and tactical alliances (between locals and international conservation 
agencies), while looking at examples of success on both main accounts 
(leaving out the cost-effectiveness criterion). We believe a step forward could 
be to prioritize between the two-three main criteria, depending on the context, 
and then decide on possible additional (donor) funding, when locals do not 
gain sufficiently from contracts. 
Literature :
Adams W.M. and Hulme D., 2001 - If community conservation is the 
answer in Africa, what is the question ? Oryx, Vol. 35, n° 3, p. 193-200.
Adhikari B., 2005 - Poverty, property rights an collective action  : 
understanding the distributive aspects of common property resource management. 
Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 10, n° 1, p. 7-31.
Adhikari B., Williams F. and Lovett J. C., 2007 - Local benefits from 
community forests in the middle hills of Nepal. Forest Policy and Economics, 
Vol. 9, n° 5, p. 464-478.
Agrawal A., 2001 - Common property institutions and sustainable 
governance of resources. World Development, Vol. 29, n° 10, p. 1649-1672.
——, 2002 - Common resources and institutional sustainability. In : Ostrom 
E., Ditz T., Dolsak N., Stern P.C., Stonich S. & Weber E.U., eds. - The drama of 
the commons. Washington D.C. : National Academy Press, p. 41-77.
Antona M., Biénabe E.M., Salles J.M., Péchard G., Aubert S. and 
Ratsimbarison R., 2004 - Rights transfers in Madagascar : Biodiversity policies : 
achievements and significance. Environment and Development Economics, 
Vol. 9, n° 6, p. 825-847.
Araújo M.B. and Rahbek C., 2007 - Conserving biodiversity in a world of 
conflicts. Journal of Biogeography, Vol. 34, n° 2, p. 199-200.
The international debate on forest management transfer and our contribution
41
Balmford A., Moore J.L., Brooks T., Burgess N., Hansen L.P., Williams 
P. and Rahbek C., 2001 - Conservation conflicts across Africa. Science, n° 291, 
p. 2616-2619.
Barbier E.B. and Burgess J.C., 2001 - Tropical deforestation, tenure 
security and unsustainability. Forest Science, November, Vol. 47, n° 4, p. 497-509.
Blaikie P., 2006 - Is small really beautiful  ? Community-based natural 
resource management in Malawi and Botswana. World Development, November, 
Vol. 34, n° 11, p. 1942-1957.
Blanc-Pamard C. and Fauroux E., 2004 - L’illusion participative. 
Exemples ouest-malgaches. Autrepart, Vol. 31, n° 3, p. 3-19.
Blanc-Pamard C. and Rakoto Ramiarantsoa H., 2007. - Normes 
environnementales, transferts de gestion et recompositions territoriales en pays 
Betsiléo (Madagascar). La gestion contractualisée des forêts. Natures Sciences 
Sociétés, July - September, Vol. 15, n° 3, p. 253-268.
Bruner A.G., Gullison R., Rice R.E. and da Fonseca G. A., 2001 - 
Effectiveness of parks in protecting tropical biodiversity. Science, n° 291, 
p. 125-128.
Castrén J., 2005 - Ownership and incentive in joint forest management : A 
survey. Development Policy Review, Vol. 23, n° 1, p. 87-104.
Carret J.C. and Loyer D., 2003 - Comment financer durablement le 
réseau d’aires protégées à Madagascar  ? Apport de l’analyse économique. 
Washington D.C. : World Bank ; Paris : Agence Française de Développement ; 
Durban : World Parks Congress, Memo.
Casse T. and Milhøj A., 2011 – Community Forestry and Forest 
Conservation  : Friends or Strangers ? Environmental Policy and Governance, 
Vol. 21, n° 2, 83-98 
Chakraborty R.N., 2001 - Stability and outcomes of common property 
institutions in forestry  : Evidence form the Terai region in Nepal. Ecological 
Economics, Vol. 36, n° 2, p. 341-354.
Chomitz K.M., 2007 - Overview – At loggerheads ? Agricultural expansion, 
poverty reduction and environment in the tropical forests. Washington D.C. : 
World Bank, 32 p.
Danish Council for Social Science Research (Danida), Copenhagen, 
2007 - Community‑based natural resource management. Technical note. 
Copenhagen : Danida, www.um.dk
Deacon R.T., 1999 - Deforestation and ownership : evidence form historical 
accounts and contemporary data. Land Economics, Vol. 75, n° 3, p. 341-359.
Ellis E.A. and Porter-Bolland L., 2008 - Is community-based forest 
management more effective than protected areas ? : A comparison of land use/land 
cover change in two neighboring study areas of the Central Yucatan Peninsula, 
Mexico. Forest Ecology and Management, Vol. 256, n° 11, p. 1971 - 1983.
Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer 
42
Ferraro P.J., 2002 - The local costs of establishing protected areas in 
low-income nations  : Ranomafana national park, Madagascar. Ecological 
Economics, December, Vol. 43, n° 2-3, p. 261- 275.
Gezon L., 1997 - Institutional structure and the effectiveness of integrated 
conservation and development projects : Case study from Madagascar. Human 
Organization, Vol. 56, n° 4, p. 462 - 470.
——, 2000 - The changing face of NGOs : Structure and communitas in 
conservation and development in Madagascar. Urban Anthropology, Vol. 29, 
n° 2, p. 181-215.
Gibson C.C., Williams J.T. and Ostrom E., 2005 - Local enforcement and 
better forests. World Development, February, Vol. 33, n° 2, p. 273-284.
Glasmeir A.K. and Farrigan T. 2005 - Understanding community forestry. 
A qualitative meta-study of the concept, the process, and its potential for poverty 
alleviation in the United States case. The Geographical Journal, Vol. 171, n° 1, 
p. 56-69.
Hayes T.M., 2006 - Parks, people and forest protection : An institutional 
assessment of the effectiveness of protected areas. World Development, 
December, Vol. 34, n° 12, p. 2064-2075.
Hockley N.J. and Andriamarovololona M.M., 2007 - The economics 
of community forest management in Madagascar  : Is there a free lunch ? An 
analysis of ‘transfert de gestion. Antananarivo : USAID.
Hulme D. and Murphree M., 2001 - African Wildlife & Livelihoods. The 
promise and performance of community conservation. Oxford : James Currey Ltd.
Hutton J., Willams A.M. and Murombedzi J.C., 2005 - Back to barriers ? 
Changing narratives in biodiversity conservation. Forum for Development 
Studies, vol. 32, n° 2, p. 341-370.
Iversen V., Chhetry B., Francis P., Gurung M., Kaffle G., Pain A . 
and Seeley J., 2006 - High value forests, hidden economies and elite capture : 
Evidence from forest user groups in Nepal’s Terai. Ecological Economics, June, 
Vol. 58, n° 1, p. 93-107.
Klein J., Réau B., Kalland I. and Edwards M., 2007 - Conservation, 
development, and a heterogeneous community  : The case of Ambohitantely 
Special Reserve, Madagascar. Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 20, n° 5, 
p. 451-467.
Larson B.A., 1994 - Changing the economics of environmental degradation 
in Madagascar : Lessons from the National Environmental Action Plan process. 
World Development, Vol. 22, n° 5, p. 671-689.
Leach M., Mearns R. and Scoones I., 1997 - Environmental entitlements : 
a framework for understanding the institutional dynamics of environmental 
change. Brighton : Institute of Development Studies, 29 p.
The international debate on forest management transfer and our contribution
43
Li T.M., 2002 - Engaging simplications  : Community-Based Resource 
Management, market processes and state agendas in upland Southeast Asia. 
World Development, February, Vol. 30, n° 2, p. 265-283.
Marcus R.R., 2001 - Seeing the forest for the trees : Integrated conservation 
and development projects and local perceptions of conservation in Madagascar. 
Human Ecology, December, Vol. 29, n° 4, p. 381-997.
Matta J.R. and Alavalapati J., 2006 - Perceptions of collective action and 
its success in community based natural resource management  : An empirical 
analysis. Forest Policy and Economics, March, Vol. 9, n° 3, p. 274-284.
McConnell W.J. and Sweeney S.P., 2005 - Challenges of Forest Governance 
in Madagascar. The Geographical Journal, Vol. 171, n° 2, p. 223-238.
Minten B., 2003 - Compensation and cost of conservation payments for 
biodiversity. Ithaca (NYC) : Cornell University, Working Paper 142, 24 p.
Misra D. and Kant S., 2004 - Production analysis of collaborative forest 
management using an example of joint forest management from Gujarat, India. 
Forest Policy and Economics, June, Vol. 6, n° 3-4, p. 301-320.
Montagne P., Razanamaharo Z. and Cooke A., 2007 - Tanteza, Le 
transfert de gestion à Madagascar – dix ans d’efforts. Antananarivo : Resolve.
Moser C., 2008 - An economic analysis of deforestation in Madagascar 
in the 1990s. Environmental Sciences  : Journal of Integrative Environmental 
Research, February, Vol. 5, n° 2, p. 91-10
Nagendra H. and Gokhale Y., 2008  - Management regimes, property 
rights, and forest biodiversity in Nepal and India. Environmental Management, 
Vol. 41, n° 5, p. 719-733.
Nino-Murcia A., 2006 - Investing in natural capital : A financial assessment 
of social forestry in northern India. The Journal of Environment and Development, 
Vol. 15, n° 3, p. 317-331.
Ormsby A. and Kaplin B.A., 2005 - A framework for understanding 
community resident perceptions of Masoala national park. Madagascar. 
Environmental Conservation, June, Vol. 32, n° 2, p. 156-164.
Oyono P.R., 2005 - Profiling local-level outcomes of environmental 
decentralization : The case of Cameroon’s forest in the Congo Basin. The Journal 
of Environment and Development, September, Vol. 14, n° 3, p. 317-33.
Oyono P.R., Kouna C. and Mala W., 2005 - Benefits of forests in Cameroon. 
Global structure, issues involving access and decision-making hiccoughs. Forest 
policy and economics, March, Vol. 7, n° 3, p. 357-363.
Pagdee A., Kim Y.S. and Daugtherty P.J., 2006 - What makes community 
forest management successful : A meta-study from community forests throughout 
the world. Society and Natural resources, Vol. 19, n° 1, p. 33-52.
Peters J., 1999 - Understanding conflicts between people and parks in 
Ranomafana, Madagascar. Agriculture and Human Values, March, Vol. 16, n° 1, 
p. 65-74.
Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer 
44
Pollini J., 2007 - Slash‑and‑burn cultivation and deforestation in the 
Malagasy rain forests : Representations and results. Ithaca (NYC) : Ph.D. thesis, 
Cornell University.
Poteete A.R. and Ostrom E., 2004 - In pursuit of comparable concepts 
and data about collective action. Agricultural Systems, Vol. 82, n° 3, p. 215-232.
Prado R., 1995 - Community Forestry Comes of Age. Journal of Forestry, 
November, Vol. 93, n° 11, p. 20-24.
Raik D.B. and Decker D. J., 2007 - A multisector framework for assessing 
community-based forest management : Lessons from Madagascar. Ecology and 
Society, Vol. 12, n° 1, p. 1-14 : www.ecologyandsociety.org
Razafindralambo G. and Gaylord L. 2006 - Madagascar  : national 
environmental action plan. Sourcebook on emerging good practice, Part 3. 
wwwMfDR.org 
République de Madagascar. Présidence de la République, 1996 - Loi 
n° 96-025 du 30 septembre 1996 relative à la gestion locale des ressources 
naturelles renouvelables. Journal Officiel, Antanarivo.
——, 2000 - Décret No. 2000-027 du 13 janvier 2000 relatif aux 
communautés de base chargées de la gestion locale des ressources naturelles 
renouvelables. Journal Officiel, Antanarivo.
Resolve Conseil, Antananarivo, 2005. - Évaluation et perspectives des 
transferts de gestion des ressources naturelles dans le cadre du programme 
environnemental  : 3, Rapport final de synthèse. Antananarivo  : Consortium 
Resolve – PCP (Cirad – Fofifa -Université d’Antananarivo – IRD).
Ribot J.C., Agrawal A. and Larson A.M., 2006 - Recentralizing while 
decentralizing : How national governments reappropriate forest resource. World 
Development, Vol. 34, n° 11, p. 1864-1886.
Rice R.E., Sugal C.A., Ratay S.M. and da Fonseca G.A.B., 
2001  -  Sustainable forest management  : a review of conventional wisdom. 
Washington D.C.  : Advances in Applied Biodiversity Science, n° 3, CABS/
Conservation International.
Salafsky N., Cauley H., Balachander G., Cordes B., Parks J.  and 
Margolius C., 2001 - A systematic test of an enterprise strategy for 
community-based biodiversity conservation. Conservation Biology, Vol. 15, 
n° 6, p. 1585- 1595.
Schackleton S., Campbell B., Wollenberg E. and Edmunds D., 
2002 - Devolution and community based management : creating space for local 
people to participate and benefit ? London : Overseas Development Institute, 
Natural resources perspectives (76), 6 p. 
Sigogneau P. and Rajaspera B., 1998. - La gestion participative des 
ressources forestières, Chapitre 7. In : POLFOR ‑ Aménagement et gestion 
participative des forêts, Workshop Report, 14‑16 October 1998, Antananarivo.
The international debate on forest management transfer and our contribution
45
Shresta K.K. and McManus P., 2007 - The embeddedness of collective 
action in Nepalese community forestry. Small‑scale Forestry, Vol. 6, n° 3, 
p. 273-290.
Sood K.K. and Gupta H.K., 2007 - Implications of Indian forests, 
perspectives of Joint Forest Management. Small‑scale Forestry, Vol. 6, n° 3, 
p. 291-308.
Sunderlin W., Hatcher J. and Liddle M., 2008. - From Exclusion to 
Ownership ? Challenges and Opportunities in Advancing Forest Tenure Reform. 
Washington D.C : Rights and Resource Initiative.
Tucker C.M., Randolph J.C. and Castellanos E.J., 2007 - Institutions, 
biophysical factors and history : An integration analysis of private and common 
property forests in Guatemala and Honduras. Human Ecology, Vol. 35, n° 3, 
p. 259-274.
Varughese G. and Ostrom E., 2001 - The contested role of heterogeneity 
in collective action : some evidence from community forestry in Nepal. World 
Development, vol. 29, n° 5, p. 747-765.
Vermeulen S. and Sheil D., 2007. - Partnership for tropical conservation. 
Oryx, vol, 41, n° 4, p. 434-440.
Weber W. and Vedder A., 2001 - Trends and challenges in applied reserach 
and conservation. In : Weber W., White L.J.T., Vedder A., Naughton-Treves L., 
eds. - African rain forest ecology & conservation. New Haven : Yale University 
Press, p. 547- 556.
Wily L.A. and Mbaya S., 2001 - Land, people and forests in eastern and 
southern Africa at the beginning of the 21st Century. Nairobi : IUCN.
Abstract
By outlining the international debate on local management of forest resources, the 
authors of this volume concerning the Malagasy example of local forest management 
attempt to address the international debate by pointing out two major observations : 
objective setting is crucial, and the transfer of management is a strategy defined 
differently by the various stakeholders. If the objectives of local management contracts 
are numerous and even contradictory, the conclusions about success or failure of any 
case study become ambiguous. Numerous objectives also invite stakeholders to define 
various and often contradictory strategies. One way forward could be to prioritize 
between objectives, depending on the local context, and then decide on additional 
funding, when local stakeholders do not gain sufficiently, economically, socially or in 
institutional terms, from the local management contracts. 
KEYWORDS : Madagascar, local management of forest resources, transfert of 
management Gelose Law.
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Résumé
A propos du transfert de gestion des forêts aux communautés villageoises : 
notre contribution au débat international (exemples malgaches)
À partir du débat international sur la gestion locale des ressources forestières, les 
auteurs de ce volume examinent l’exemple malgache du transfert de la gestion de 
forêts à des communautés villageoises. Leurs conclusions soulignent deux principaux 
points. Premièrement, la clarification des objectifs dans les contrats est un aspect 
crucial. Deuxièmement, les parties contractantes définissent différemment l’objectif 
du transfert. Les objectifs des contrats de gestion locale étant nombreux et parfois 
opposés, il est difficile d’identifier les cas qui caractérisent nettement un succès ou un 
échec de la gestion locale. Établir un ordre de priorité entre les différents objectifs en 
fonction du contexte local apparaît comme une piste à suivre. De même que solliciter 
un financement supplémentaire, lorsque les acteurs locaux ne tirent pas un bénéfice 
suffisant des contrats de gestion locale en termes économique, social ou institutionnel. 
MOTS-CLÉS : Madagascar, Gestion locale des forêts, Transfert de gestion, Loi Gelose.
